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1 Introduction
Voters punish their government for overseeing an economic crisis. What is conventionally called
economic voting (Key, 1961; Fiorina, 1981; Anderson, 2000; Andersen et al., 2013). This, as
governments are generally perceived as being responsible for the welfare of their citizens. However,
making such attributions of responsibility becomes more complicated, as the clear cut boundaries
of sovereign power dissolves (Eichengreen, 2008; Keohane and Nye, 2001). As such, increasing
economic and political interdependence between otherwise sovereign nations challenges the basic
relationship between the economic fortune of the electorate and the electoral fortune of the
government. Put in the form of a question: how are voters supposed to hold national governments
accountable for their economic performance, when the economic situation is, in part, driven by
forces which are no longer controlled by these national governments?
Nowhere is this question more relevant than in Europe, where a seemingly endless recession
is taking its toll. For the first time since the Second World War the European economy has
contracted significantly. One in every ten European is unemployed. In some countries it is more
than one in five - a catastrophic proportion. At the same time, the European countries are
the most interdependent in the world. Accordingly, most European countries have a high level
of economic openness, capital mobility and last but not least a membership of the European
Union. The most restrictive supranational organization in the history of the world (Andrews,
1994; Milner and Moravcsik, 2009; Keohane and Nye, 2001).
Consequently, history has placed voters of the European nations in a pinch: they desperately
1
need leaders who can solve the worst economic crisis in decades, but increasing interdependence
has made it difficult for them to discern whether their current leaders are up to the job. The dis-
sertation proposed here tries to understand how ordinary Europeans react to this interdependence
problem of economic voting.
How does increasing economic and political interdependence affect the way Euro-
pean voters hold national politicians accountable for their economic performance?
In this proposal I sketch out a dissertation which seeks to answer this research question, by
looking beyond the current economic crisis: examining how interdependence has influenced the
electoral patterns of post-war European democracies the past fifty years.
The remainder of the proposal is organized as follows: First, I sketch out how the dissertation
will contribute to the extant literature in particular, and to our understanding of politics in
general. Second, I use existing rational choice models in conjunction with political economy
literature on how interdependence affects national economies to derive some hypothesis about
how the European voter’s react to the interdependence problem. Third, I discuss the methods
and data the dissertation will use to test these hypotheses. Specifically, I suggest that one might
get around issues of internal and external validity by combining time series cross sectional (TSCS)
data on European elections with a set of survey experiments. Using the TSCS data to delineate
whether the hypotheses predict electoral behavior, and the experimental data to study whether
they predict the electoral behavior for the “right” reasons. Fourth and finally, I turn to some
practical considerations on the structure of the dissertation and how I hope to contribute to the
research environment at the University of Copenhagen.
2 Contributions of the dissertation
The dissertation will look into one of the most fundamental questions of contemporary political
science – what are the consequences of growing interdependence for democratic polities – and try
to answer it from a novel angle: namely, by studying electoral behavior.
This may seem odd. Conventionally, studying the effects of interdependence has been the
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purview of political economists studying the influence of interdependence on economic perfor-
mance (for example Obstfeld, 2001; Garrett, 1998). Or students of public policy, looking into
the effect of interdependence on policy making and diffusion (Gilardi 2010; Case & Besley 1995).
Or political institutionalists, studying its effect on the quality of democratic institutions (Rudra,
2005; Li and Reuveny, 2006).
While these approaches have presented us with sound knowledge about how globalization
changes the social, economic and institutional features of modern democracies, the premise of
this dissertation is that we do not know whether voters recognize and act on these changes.
Whether voters take the effects of increasing interdependence into account when they vote.
This is a question of great importance, as it speaks to the continued democratic legitimacy
of electoral decision-making (Bartels 2010). A legitimacy which rests on voters ability to hold
bad leaders accountable for bad decisions (Achen and Bartels, 2004b,a). If voters no longer have
this possibility under conditions of economic and political interdependence, one of the arguments
for democracy is nullified: More competent decision making will no longer be a fait accompli of
electoral democracies (Anderson, 2007). Further, this potential disconnect between electorates
and those they elect may have several democratic sideeffects, such as a decreased feeling of efficacy,
or a decreased trust in government - leaving the already low trust in European governments even
lower (Eurobarometer, 2012).
Apart from giving some some insight into the continued viability of electoral decision making
as an effective mechanism for ensuring democratic legitimacy, the dissertatioin will also provide
empirical foundation for discussing several important political issues. By examining whether
voters are able to effectivly hold their own nation state accountable for their welfare in the face
of growing interdependence, the dissertation will add to the debate on whether globalization
demands stronger global institutionalization.Whether it makes sense to look at how alternative
political structeres, such as the European Union, can be held politically accountable for the welfare
of European citizens as a whole (Achen and Bartels, 2004b). Finally, the dissertation will help
us understand what economic information voters find informative when assessing the competence
of their political leaders. This knowledge will give political candidates and political journalists a
normative foundation for presenting economic information: namely, by focusing on what informs
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voter decision-making. Further, this knowledge may also help independent economic think-tanks,
such as the OECD or the Danish Economic Council, to focus their analysis (or at least their
presentation) on economic factors which voters can use in an electoral context.
3 Interdependence and Economic voting: Theory and hy-
potheses
Below this dissertation proposal will try to form some tentative expectations about how increasing
economic and poltical interdependence affect the tendency among voters to punish their govern-
ments in bad economic times, and reward them in good times. The section is divided into three
subsections. The first introduces the core assumptions and core prediction of economic voting.
The second critically examines these core assumptions under conditions of increasing interdepen-
dence, leading to the first hypothesis: that growing interdependence decrease the use of absolute
national indicators as a guide on Election Day. The third and final subsection then discuss how
we may tweak these assumptions to make them more congruent with interdependence, leading to
the second hypotheses: that voters use comparative economic information in stead, benchmarking
national economic outcomes across borders, to take interdependence into account.
The assumption underlying the hypotheses made in this section, is that voters are rational
decision makers. The reason for making this assumption is twofold. First of all, most landmark
works on economic voting use a rational choice approach (Downs, 1957; Key, 1961; Fiorina, 1978;
Salmon, 1987; Lewis-Beck, 1990; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Besley and Case, 1995; Duch
and Stevenson, 2012). Accordingly, using rational actor assumptions gives the dissertation a
sound and well defined theoretical platform. Second of all, the rational choice approach often
entails the epistemic advantage of making very clear point predictions (Schotter 2006).This, as
the rational choice voter lives in a very simple and stylized environment, making her reactions to
the interdependence problem quite easy to predict.
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3.1 The central tenants of Economic voting
The theory of economic voting can be summed up by two related assumptions, which allow
us to make a prediction about how voters act on Election Day. The first assumption is that
political leaders vary in how competently they handle the economy(Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995,
188-203;Ferejohn, 1986;Duch and Stevenson, 2012, 131-148). Competent politicians are able to
improve economic conditions, whereas incompetent politicians make them worse.
Where economic conditions can be understood as some general indicator of welfare – most
often GDP per capita. The second assumption is that voters are able to (at least on average)
infer how competently politicians handle the economy by extracting a competence signal from
looking at their own economic conditions (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1978, 1981). Accordingly, the
theory suggests that rational voters will prefer to have a competent politician in office as this
increase their expected utility. Following from these assumptions, the essential prediction becomes
that voters reelect incumbent politicians when economic conditions during the incumbent’s term
have improved (Kramer, 1971; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kiewiet, 1981; Paldam and Beck, 2000;
Paldam and Nannestad, 2012; Duch and Stevenson, 2012; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Borre
and Andersen, 1997). This ensures, in turn, that incompetent leaders have a short shelf life in
democratic politics – whereas competent ones get reelected.
3.2 When the competence signal gets too noisy: The interdependence
problem
Now let us throw some interdependence into the mix. In the introduction of this dissertation
proposal I suggested that, due to increasing economic and political interdependence, voters in
contemporary Europe could no longer simply use past economic conditions to determine how
competent their leaders were. Below this argument is fleshed out.
Most students of political economy agrees that - almost by definition - increasing interde-
pendence constrain the relationship between the competence of politicians and the economic
condtions of ordinary citizens (e.g. Mishra, 1999; Moses, 2000; Eichengreen, 2008). Economic
openness makes it harder to perpetrate fiscal policy (Mundell 2001), increased capital movement
makes it necessary for national policies to diverge (at least somewhat) in order to attract capital
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(Andrews, 1994), and increased international cooperation puts a strain on some forms of national
regulation (Keohane and Nye, 2001). As I mentioned in the introduction these conditions are
especially descriptive of the European nations.
Following this point, increasing interdependence reduce voter’s ability to extract a meaningful
signal about an incumbent politician’s competence from their own economic conditions. As the
proportion of variation in economic conditions which stems from international forces increase, the
probability that voters can correctly infer incumbent competence from these economic conditions
become severely reduced (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). This can be shown formally (Duch and
Stevenson, 2012, chap. 5), but should also be pretty intuitive: when the effect governments
have on the economic situation is small relative to international shocks, it becomes hard to trace
the direction and size of the government’s effect, by simply looking at the aggregate economic
situation.
If the relationship between government competence and economic outcomes decrease, and
the ability of voters to extract a meaningful competence signal from the remaining effects is
reduced, the core assumptions of economic voting laid out above is severely challenged. How does
this change the essential prediction: that voters punish governments when the economy turns
sour? Recall, that voters preferred having a competent politician in office as this increased their
future expected utility. Accordingly, voters reacted to changes in economic conditions during an
incumbent’s term in office, because they believed they could infer from these economic conditions
how competent leading politicians were. As the probability of inferring competence from changes
in economic conditions is reduced, so is the motivation for reacting to these economic conditions.
Accordingly, as competence becomes more difficult to infer from economic conditions, voters
should focus less on these economic conditions and more on other factors (e.g. redistributive or
ideological concerns). This leads to the first hypothesis, which I will investigate in the dissertation.
Hypothesis 1: Voters respond to increasing political and economic interdependence
by relying less on national economic conditions when deciding whether to reelect the
current government.
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3.3 Different signals: Solutions to the interdependence problem
Now let us look at how the European voters might try to get around the problem related to
interdependence by looking at different economic information.
Previous research in economic voting has shown that voters do not weigh all information
about the economy equally when trying to assess competence. Rather they single out certain
indicators which they respond to (Paldam and Nannestad, 2012; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979).
In most empirical explorations researchers have found that voters primarily care about GDP
per capita, unemployment or inflation (in descending order of empirical importance) (Kramer,
1971). There are a couple of different reasons for why a voter might choose to focus on a given
indicator: it may be the only one which they have information about (Zaller 1992), they might
care especially about the development in certain indicators (i.e. the indicator has a large influence
on their expected utility) or they might see the indicator as more informative with regards to
competence. The latter being what is interesting for the dissertation.
Little research have explored whether voters weigh economic indicators based on how infor-
mative they are with regards to the government’s competence (for a notable exception see Alesina
et al. 1993). Even so, rational voters should – all else being equal – weigh efficient and unbi-
ased indicators more heavily when trying to infer competence. Accordingly, as interdependence
increase European voters should not simply shy away from economic indicators of incumbent
competence all together, but start to look around for different economic indicators, which take
the role international forces play in shaping national economic outcomes into account.
This may seem quite abstract. What alternative indicators can take interdependence into
account?
One alternative is comparative information. Instead of evaluating economic conditions in ab-
solute levels, voters can look at differences in economic conditions between their own country and
a country which is equally affected by international economic forces. That voters may evaluate
how competently governing politicians perform by using comparative information is not a new
idea (Salmon, 1987; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; MacKuen et al., 1992; Kayser and Peress, 2012).
However, none of the previous studies have linked the use of comparative information explicitly
with increasing interdependence. Nevertheless, comparisons make it possible for voters to dif-
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ference out the effects of international forces, leaving them with a signal which is (on average)
proportional to the difference in competence between their own leaders and the leader of the
compared country. This presents voters with a signal, which is related to competence, yet un-
related to the effect on international competence. Accordingly, grwoing interdependence should
spur voters interes in how they are doing compared to other European countries.
This leads us to the second hypothesis I will investigate in the dissertation.
Hypothesis 2: Voters respond to increasing political and economic interdepen-
dence by relying more on the comparative economic conditions of their country when
deciding whether to reelect the current government.
4 Research Design: Studying the Interdependence problem
In this section I lay out the methodological approach of the dissertation. Namely, how I will
try to test the hypotheses derived above. Basically, I will approach the hypotheses from two
angles. Using existing time series cross sectional data (TSCS) on European elections and economic
conditions, and by designing and perpetrating a set of small-scale survey experiments.
Why is this type of methedological triangulation nessecary? Even thought we can use the
TSCS data to test whether and how interdependence affects voting behavior, any aggregate level
effect might be mediated by a causal mechanism which differs markedly from the one stated in the
hypotheses. Specifically, the survey experiments can investegate whether voters, on an individual
level, actually concern themselves with how interdependent their country is, and how well it
performs economically, when deciding whom to vote for. Put differently, the two data sources
gives me the best of both worlds. The observed economic and electoral data gives the dissertation
external validity, whereas using experimental data gives the dissertation internal validity.
The two different data sources and the two hypotheses structure the empirical explorations of
the dissertation, see table one. Below we shortly describe how we will test each hypothesis using
both the TSCS data and the experimental data resulting in a total of four studies. The studies
are described in some detail, to make it evident how the dissertation will approach testing the
hypothesis.
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Table 1: An overview of the four studies embedded in the dissertation
H1: Effect of interdependence H2: Use of Comparative information
TCSC data Study one Study three
Experimental data Study two Study four
4.1 Testing the first hypothesis: Does interdependence work as a mod-
erator?
The first hypothesis stated that voters respond to increasing political and economic interde-
pendence by relying less on national economic conditions when deciding whether to reelect the
incumbent government. In order to test this hypothesis, I will investigate whether changes in
economic and political interdependence moderates the relationship between economic conditions
and the electoral support for governing politicians. As such, the key will be to discern whether
increasing interdependence reduce the effect economic conditions have on the incumbent’s vote
share.
Study 1: To test how voters respond to increasing interdependence, study one will interact
observed TSCS country-level data on economic outcomes with indicators of interdependence in
a statistical model predicting electoral support for the incumbent government. Unlike previous
comparative studies of economic voting, study one will use a country fixed effects approach,
utilizing within country variation in the indicators of interdependence, the economy and election
results (see for example Whitten and Powell, 1993, or Anderson, 2000). This is done to improve
the causal interpretation of the estimated effects. Differences in economic voting is measured by
how strongly changes in absolute national economic indicators affect the incumbent government’s
vote share.
Following previous comparative literature, I will use growth in GDP per capita and unemploy-
ment as the primary economic indicators (Kramer, 1971; Erikson, 2009; Andersen et al., 2013).
Interdependence will be measured using a host of different indicators, in order to investigate
whether a robust pattern in interdependence’s effect on economic voting appears (Hellwig and
Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2008). For instance looking at whether a relatively small and increasingly
open economy such as the Danish has seen a larger reduction in their level of economic voting,
than larger and more closed economies such as Germany or France. And whether voters in coun-
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tries with high levels of capital mobility, such as Britain and Switzerland, have lower levels of
economic voting than countries with less flexible and more densely regulated financial sectors.
To further improve causal inference study one will also focus on indicators which have a
discontinuous development. Indicators which capture “shocks” to the level of interdependence
in a country, and consequently can work as a quasi-experiments. One such indicator could be
membership of the European Union.
Study 2: To investigate whether the causal mechanisms underlying hypothesis one is an ade-
quate approximation of how voters reason, study 2 will use a set of vignette survey experiments.
The survey experiments will present subjects with a set of economic information about a hypo-
thetical country (A) run by a hypothetical government. Based on this information voters are
asked to report how likely they would be to reelect the hypothetical government. The use of
fictional political entities allows me to control and manipulate the economic information voters
are able to take into account, while sidestepping any ethical concerns related to deception (Tomz
and Van Houweling, 2008).
I have previously used this methodology to identify some of the causal mechanisms which
underlie economic voting (Larsen, 2013). While the experiment will be most effective if it is
completed using a representative sample, it could work with a convenience sample as well.
Taken together study 1 and study 2 will get us closer to understanding whether and why
interdependence affect voters reliance on conventional indicators of incumbent competence such
as GDP per capita growth. It will thus deliver the first piece of the puzzle which motivated this
dissertation: namely, whether increasing political and economic interdependence change the way
voters hold their political leaders accountable for economic hardship.
4.2 Testing the second hypothesis: Is there an effect of economic com-
parisons?
The second hypothesis proposed that voters would rely on comparative economic information
to infer political competence. An indicator which is less sensitive to international economic
fluctuations. In order to test this hypothesis, the dissertation will look at whether and how voters
respond to developments in their own economic conditions relative to that of other countries.
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Study 3: The third study will examine the second hypothesis using the same TSCS data
sources as study 1. However, instead of looking at absolute levels of economic growth and un-
employment it will look at cross-country differences. The main independent variable will be
differences in unemployment and economic growth between European countries and the depen-
dent variable will be electoral support for the government.
Study 3 will not just look at whether voters act on comparative economic information, but also
whether they do so in response to increasing interdependence. This is important, as social psy-
chologists have documented that people are intrinsically predisposed to make social comparisons
(Mussweiler and Posten, 2012; Festinger, 1954). Consequently, voters may already be compar-
ing their own countries’ economic conditions to that of other countries. Even in the absence of
interdependence.
In order to investigate whether interdependence drives the use of comparative information,
study 3 will look at what type of countries, voters are most likely to compare their own country
with. Of special interest will be, whether voters compare themselves with countries which are
similarly affected by the world economy. Accordingly, if voters use comparative information to
“partial out” the effect of the international economy, this is the type of countries they should use
in their comparisons (Salmon, 1987). We would expect Danes, for instance, to compare Danish
economic conditions with those in a country like Sweden, which is also (relatively) small and has
a very open economy, and not Germany - which is affected differently because of its size - or
Norway - which is affected differently because of its reliance on natural resources.
Study 4: The purpose of study four will be to investigate whether voters use alternative
indicators because they find these indicators more informative to incumbent competence under
conditions of interdependence. In other words, whether the causal mechanism underlying hypoth-
esis two is valid. It will use a vignette-survey experiment just like study two. Accordingly, it will
present economic information on a hypothetical country (A) run by a hypothetical government,
and ask subjects how inclined they are to vote for the hypothetical government based on this
information. However, it will be somewhat more complicated than study two as it will also en-
tail some comparative economic information: This might be economic information on an equally
interdependent country “B”, an OECD statement about country A’s economic policy relative to
11
others or a third type of comparative information.
Taken together study three and four investigates whether voters are able to regain some insight
into how aptly their government perform, when conventional economic indicators become less
informative due to increasing economic and political interdependence. And accordingly, whether
democratic polities can continue to rely on their electorate to insure competent leadership.
5 Getting the job done: Some practical considerations
5.1 Advisor and contribution to the research at UCPH
My preferred advisor would be Professor Kasper Møller Hansen, Professor Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
or Associate Professor Peter Dinesen. Their knowledge on different aspects of the project would
all be valuable (Dinesen, 2013; Nørgaard et al., 2012; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001; Kurrild-Klitgaard
and Berggren, 2004; Hansen and Bech, 2007; Hansen, 2007). Especially Kasper Møller Hansen’s
previous work on the competence of citizens and experimental methods in relation to economic
voting (Hansen & Bech 2008) along with his current work on how the economic crisis affect voting
behavior (Andersen et al., 2013) would give me a profound knowledge of the methods I want to
use, and the field in which I wish to publish.
Further, I would hope to learn from and contribute to the vibrant research environment at
the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen.
Specifically, the dissertation is in line with several current research projects at the Centre for
Elections and Parties. The focus on how people use economic experiences to shape their vote
choice would thus fit nicely with the project undertaken by Rasmus Tue Pedersen on how people
perceive numerical frames, and the project undertaken by Asmus Olsen on historical and social
reference points in citizens evaluations of performance measures. However, this project will also be
able to draw lines to non-political behavior research conducted at the department. For example,
understanding how the premises of national elections change, when interdependence increase
would be of interest to the work done by Professor Marlene Wind, Professor Ben Rosamund and
post.doc Julie Nielsen on the democratic antecedents and implications of European integration.
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5.2 External Stay
A semester as visiting fellow at the Nuffield College, Oxford University, would be highly beneficial.
I have previously had a short stay there, where I was taught by Professor Raymond Duch. He is
currently doing research using experimental methods in relation to certain aspects of economic
voting (Duch et al., 2012), and his advice would surely strengthen the dissertation.
5.3 Qualifications
My professional experience and prior education has provided me with the qualifications necessary
to carry out this PhD project. While these are mentioned in the attached CV, three factors are
especially important to note.
First, I have had experience with doing independent research. I have published two co-
authored peer-reviewed papers, and have several papers under review at the moment (see CV).
In these papers I have collected and analyzed unique data, and contributed theoretically and
empirically to the field of voting behavior. While this project is distinct from my former research,
it relates to it, in that it seeks to understand how voters deal with an increasingly complex
information environment.
Second, I have a broad knowledge of the field of voting behavior and the methods I wish
to use as part of the dissertation. I was thoroughly introduced to political behavior, when I
attended the Stanford Summer Institute in Political Psychology, and have since written several
papers on voting behavior in conjunction with classes taken as part of my first year as a master
student. Further, working as a research assistant at the Ministry of Finance has provided me
with some experience in dealing with aggregate level economic and political data. Further, I have
attended a course on experimental at the University of Oxford, and have perpetrated several
survey-experiment with student samples.
Finally, my methodological skills have been persistently honed by teaching undergraduates in
methodology for the past three years. Third, I have attended a number of international academic
seminars, both as part of my summer schools and at the University of Copenhagen and have
peer-reviewed several chapters of an anthology on Political Marketing. As a consequence, I have
become accustomed to reviewing and critiquing academic work.
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